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Abstract
This paper provides a simple model that examines a firm’s incentive to
invest in a network infrastructure through coalition formation in an open-
access environment with a deregulated retail market. A regulator faces a
dilemma between inducing an incentive for eﬃcient investment and reducing
the distortion generated by imperfect competition. We show that, in such
a case, the degree of cost-reducing eﬀect of the investment is crucial from
a welfare point of view. In particular, when network investment through
coalition formation creates a large (small) cost-reducing eﬀect, the regulator
can (should not) delegate an investment decision to firms with an appropriate
level of access charge.
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1 Introduction
Access charges are a key factor in an entrant’s decision whether to enter in an open-
access environment with a deregulated retail market. However, they are also crucial
to an incumbent’s decision on an investment in a piece of infrastructure such as a
gas pipeline or a local fiber-optic cable. This is especially so when construction of
an infrastructure is first required in a developing region or in a rural area.
In that case, regulatory authorities have been very concerned with the question
of how to determine access charges in order to induce eﬀective competition through
eﬃcient investment incentives in network infrastructures.1 Indeed, authorities have
been facing a dilemma between inducing eﬃcient investment incentive for an incum-
bent and reducing the distortion generated by imperfect competition. When a low
access charge is set by a regulator, it can induce a level of potential entry suﬃcient
to enhance consumer welfare through a reduction of a retail price. However, setting
a low access charge may reduce an incumbent’s investment incentive, because it
reimburses a small portion of investment costs if there is no other subsidy for the
investment. When a high access charge is set, on the other hand, the opposite result
occurs.
In this paper, we provide a simple model to examine a firm’s incentive to invest
in a network infrastructure when faced with a regulated access charge. We assume
that firms can form a coalition with other firms to build a network infrastructure
and that the coalition formation has a cost-reducing eﬀect on the firms’ production
cost. In reality, we have already observed some coalitions in the construction of
an infrastructure in network industries. For example, in Japan, the construction
of a gas pipeline from Fuji to Gotenba in Shizuoka prefecture involved cooperation
1For example, the controversy concerning forward-looking rules as investment incentives for
technological progress in telecommunications is well remembered. See Sidak and Spulber (1997),
Laﬀont and Tirole (2000), Noam (2002), and de Bijl and Peitz (2002) for the controversy concerning
forward-looking rules.
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between three companies (namely, Tokyo Gas Co. Ltd., Shizuoka Gas Co. Ltd.,
and Teikoku Petroleum Co. Ltd.). See also InfoCom Research, Inc. (2004) for a
description of cooperative telecommunication investment in the construction of local
fiber-optic cabling.
Applying a simple coalition formation game in an open-access environment, we
first show that the size of a coalition that an incumbent firm forms with other
firms depends on the level of access charge. In particular, when the access charge is
slightly below a stand-alone marginal cost (i.e., the marginal cost that results from a
singleton coalition for construction of network infrastructure), a grand coalition that
achieves the most eﬃcient investment in the infrastructure cannot be established.
Otherwise, a grand coalition among firms is established.
From this result, we discuss the possibility that a regulator’s setting of an access
charge is not necessarily an eﬀective tool in an open-access environment with a
deregulated retail market. In fact, when the grand coalition is formed, the level
of access charge cannot have any impact on total production. In this sense, the
regulator may face an intrinsic dilemma between achieving a low production cost
and reducing the distortion generated by imperfect competition. This is because
it can indirectly control the total production in the deregulated retail market only
through a change in the level of access charge, and the reduction of the marginal
cost is achieved by firms’ private incentive to form a coalition. In particular, we
show that, when the cost-reducing eﬀect of the coalition is small, a grand coalition
does not achieve the most eﬃcient allocation in an open-access environment with
a deregulated retail market. In this case, the initiative for an infrastructure project
should be taken by the regulator.
On the other hand, when the cost-reducing eﬀect of the coalition is large, the
grand coalition that achieves the most eﬃcient investment can also achieve the most
eﬃcient allocation in the open-access environment. Hence, in that case, the regulator
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can delegate the infrastructure project through coalition formation to firms. To sum
up, whether to delegate an infrastructure project to firms depends on the degree of
cost-reducing eﬀect of coalition formation on the firms’ production cost.
A coalition formation game is used in the model. (See Brown and Chiang (2003)
and Demange and Wooders (2005) for surveys of a recent development of coalition
formation games.) In particular, the model applies the coalition formation game of
Bloch (1996) to an open-access environment of network industries.2 This paper also
contributes to the “make-or-buy decision” literature in the following sense.3 When
faced with an input price, many earlier studies of make-or-buy decisions focused
only on entrants’ decisions. By contrast, we examine not only entrants’ decisions
but also an incumbent’s decision on the size of networks that should be made by
forming a coalition when faced with a given input price. That is, we deal with
the eﬀect of input prices on both make-or-buy decisions and coalition formation
structure endogenously and simultaneously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
setup of a simple model with coalition formation in an open-access environment.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the policy implications of
the equilibrium in an open-access environment and shows when to delegate the
infrastructure project to firms. Some concluding remarks are in Section 5.
2 The Model
We provide a model to examine a firm’s incentive to invest in a network infrastruc-
ture (hereafter called a network for short) in an open-access environment with a
deregulated retail market. For the purpose of analytical tractability, we consider
2Bloch (1995) applies his model to the examination of the performance of a standard oligopolistic
market without open access.
3The transaction cost approach to the vertical boundaries of a firm broadly deals with this issue.
See Chapter 3 of Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer (2004) for an introductory exposition.
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the simplest market structure that allows for a coalition and access to a network,
i.e., a triopolistic market where three firms produce a homogeneous good.
The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear and is given by:
P = α−Q,
where P denotes the market price, the constant α > 0, and Q ≡
P3
i=1 qi where qi is
firm i’s output.
The three firms have linear cost functions, with firm i’s marginal cost being
ci. To focus on an incentive for coalition formation, we assume that all firms can
decrease their marginal cost only by forming a coalition.4 While the examples of
this type of coalition include cooperation in R&D activities and a common standard
that a group of firms adopt, the cooperative construction of a network is the most
relevant example in network industries. In fact, as discussed in Section 1, some
coalitions for the construction of networks are already found in the Japanese gas
industry.
For simplicity, we represent the cost-reduction property of coalition formation
by a reduced marginal cost function. That is, we assume ci ≡ λ − µd (i) where
λ, µ > 0 and d (i) is the size (i.e., the number of firms) of a coalition to which firm i
belongs: the larger the size of a coalition, the lower the marginal cost. The property
stems, for example, from the fact that extensive cooperation between companies
can achieve the construction of broad gas pipelines that carry a high-calorie gas,
even though the fixed cost payment per company is not changed. This results in a
reduction of gas trasnportation cost per calorie.
Suppose an access charge w is announced by a benevolent regulator, so that it
4Generally speaking, an investment made by only one firm can have a cost-reducing eﬀect on
its own marginal cost. Suppose, however, that the cost-reducing eﬀect on a firm’s marginal cost
is achieved only by construction of an infrastructure that requires a large cash flow. In that case,
firms need to form a coalition to prepare for the cash flow, so our assumption is justified.
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is taken as given by firms. If qji represents an output of firm j that accesses a firm
i’s network when firm i constructs a network with a coalition of size d (i), firm i’s
profit is:
πi = (α−Q− (λ− µd (i))) qi + [w − (λ− µd (i))]
1
d (i)
X
j
qji, (1)
where the second term is zero if there is no access to the network. From (1) it
is apparent that the eﬀect of access to a coalition diﬀers from participation in a
coalition, in the sense that access does not reduce production cost for the coalition
members but increases their profits from the payment of the access charge.
When firm i accesses firm j’s network, the profit is:
πi = (α−Q− w) qij. (2)
We consider a three-stage game. In the first stage, the regulator announces an
access charge w in order to maximize social welfare. In the second stage, given a level
of access charge w, each firm decides whether it builds a network by forming a coali-
tion (or by itself), or accesses a network that has already been constructed. In the
third stage, each firm determines output and participates in Cournot competition.
In the coalition stage, we analyze a sequential game of coalition formation that
is considered to reflect cooperative agreements in many real business environments.
In our model where firms are ex ante identical, the sequential game of coalition
formation is formulated in a simple way.5 At first, Firm 1 is chosen as the first
5Originally, the coalition formation game is a sequential game of complete information and
infinite horizon, including a response to an oﬀer of a coalition. (If all firms in the coalition accept
the oﬀer, the coalition is formed and the procedure is repeated among the remaining firms. If
one of the prospective members rejects the oﬀer, it becomes the initiator in the next round, etc.)
However, when firms are ex ante identical, the coalition structures generated by stationary perfect
equilibria in the original game can be obtained by subgame perfect equilibria in the coalition-size
choice game. See Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 in Bloch (1996). Note that, even when we make an
additional choice of access, his result can be applied.
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proposer and announces the size of coalition that it wants to form (i.e., an integer:
1, 2, or 3).6 When it oﬀers a one-firm coalition, Firm 2 has a chance to move: it
decides whether to access Firm 1’s network, and if it does not want to access it, it
announces the size of coalition that it wants to form excluding Firm 1 (i.e., an integer
1 or 2). When Firm 1 oﬀers a two-firm coalition, Firm 3 has a chance to move: it
decides whether to access Firm 1’s network, and if it does not want to access it, it
announces a one-firm coalition. When Firm 1 oﬀers a three-firm coalition (i.e., a
grand coalition), the game ends at this move.7
3 The Equilibrium
3.1 The Nash production and the associated reduced profit
We can use a backward induction argument to derive the equilibrium. Consider the
third stage in the game. Given the coalition structure with access determined in
the second stage, we find the Nash equilibrium in the production stage. Since we
consider a triopolistic market, Nash production and the associated reduced profits
are easily derived. Firm i’s Nash production of a triopoly with a linear cost and
a linear demand is generally represented by qi = (1/4)
h
α− 3ci +
X
j 6=i
cj
i
. Sub-
stituting the relevant production costs of firms in a coalition structure with access
determined in the second stage, we obtain the Nash production in a given coali-
tion structure with access. Table 1 shows the Nash production and the associated
reduced profit for each coalition structure with or without accesses (i = 1, 2, 3).
[Insert Table 1 around here.]
6Note that the ordering of the firms is exogenously determined in this game. See Okada (1996)
for an analysis of random proposers.
7For analytical tractability, we assume that if two one-firm coalitions already exist when Firm
3 decides to access one of them, it accesses the one that was formed first (i.e., Firm 1 ’s one-firm
coalition).
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Note that π11i is identical to π
31
i . This is because the marginal eﬀect of cost re-
duction generated by a grand coalition (i.e., the benefit of forming a grand coalition)
cancels out the marginal eﬀect of fierce competition in the production stage (i.e.,
the cost of forming a grand coalition) in our model.
3.2 Coalition formation or access
Next, consider a coalition formation game in the second stage. We need to examine
a firm’s decision about whether to form a coalition to build a network or to access
an incumbent’s network, given an access charge determined by the regulator in the
first stage. In our model, the choice of access complicates the problem. However,
the following lemma is useful for deriving the equilibrium coalition formation when
a firm has the choice of access.
Lemma 1 Consider the last firm (i.e., Firm 3), which has only two alternatives, i.e.,
a one-firm coalition and access to an incumbent network. The firm chooses access
(a one-firm coalition) if w ≤ (>)λ − µ, irrespective of the size of an incumbent
network.
Proof. We need to consider all cases in which Firm 3 needs to make a decision.
Suppose a two-firm coalition is already formed. If Firm 3 chooses access, its profit
is:
π223 =
1
16
[α+ 2 (λ− 2µ)− 3w]2 ,
whereas if it forms a one-firm coalition, its profit is:
π323 =
1
16
[α− λ− µ]2 .
It is apparent that π223 ≥ (<)π323 if and only if w ≤ (>)λ−µ. When two one-firm
coalitions already exist, Firm 3’s decision is determined by comparing π533 and π
61
3 .
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Similarly, when Firm 1 forms a one-firm coalition and Firm 2 accesses it, π423 and
π523 should be compared. In all the cases, we ensure that Firm 3 prefers access to a
one-firm coalition if and only if w ≤ (>)λ− µ.
The result of the lemma is intuitively appealing: if the level of access charge
is smaller than the marginal cost achieved by a one-firm coalition, a firm that is
allowed to form a one-firm coalition always prefers access. As shown below, this
result is useful in our sequential coalition formation game.
Using lemma 1, we derive the equilibrium coalition formation structure according
to the level of access charge. We report this result as a proposition.
Proposition 1 When a regulator announces an access charge w ∈ [0, w∗], where
w∗ is defined by π111 = π
21
1 (w
∗), or w ∈ [λ− µ, +∞), a grand coalition is formed.
On the other hand, when w ∈ (w∗, λ− µ), a two-firm coalition with one-firm access
holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
[Insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium strategy of Firm 1 for a given level of access
charge w. In the figure, the horizontal axis represents the level of w, and the vertical
axis represents Firm 1’s profit associated with a coalition strategy. According to
Figure 1, the grand coalition that achieves the least marginal cost (i.e., the most
production-eﬃcient cost) can be established, except for w ∈ (w∗, λ− µ). In fact,
for w ∈ (w∗, λ− µ), Firm 1 forms a two-firm coalition, and Firm 3 accesses its
network. This means that, when the regulator announces an access charge that is a
little less than the marginal cost under a one-firm coalition, a firm has insuﬃcient
incentive to reduce the marginal cost.
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The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Suppose the level of access charge
is suﬃciently low. In that case, all followers prefer access to an incumbent’s network
to a coalition formed by themselves. Then, what size coalition should Firm 1 pro-
pose? If it oﬀers a one-firm or a two-firm coalition, it expects a large loss generated
by access because of a suﬃciently low access charge. Therefore, Firm 1, i.e., the
incumbent, has an incentive to form a grand coalition that involves the other two
firms, when the access charge is suﬃciently low.
On the other hand, suppose the level of the access charge is suﬃciently high. All
followers then prefer a coalition by themselves. In that case, the result of Proposition
1 in Bloch (1995) applies to our model: there exists a unique equilibrium coalition
structure in which the size of the largest coalition is the integer closest to (3n+ 1) /4,
where n is the number in a market. (In our model, n = 3.)
Suppose then that the level of access charge is in the intermediate range of
w ∈ (w∗, λ− µ) in Figure 1. Note that the access charge is lower than the marginal
cost under a one-firm coalition, whereas it is higher than that under a two-firm
coalition. According to lemma 1, Firm 3 prefers access to an incumbent’s network
whichever size it would be. Then, the proof of Proposition 1 shows that, when
λ− 2µ < w ≤ λ− µ, Firm 2 prefers a two-firm coalition, which includes Firm 3, to
access to Firm 1’s network. That is, if Firm 1 proposes a 1-firm coalition, Firm 2
forms a two-firm coalition. However, this proposal is apparently not favorable for
Firm 1, because it makes the other two firms more eﬃcient than Firm 1 itself, so
that Firm 1 cannot obtain a high profit in the production stage.
Therefore, we only need to consider which is better for Firm 1: forming a grand
coalition or forming a two-firm coalition. If Firm 1 proposes a grand coalition, all
firms can be eﬃcient, so that the highest equilibrium production associated with the
lowest equilibrium price holds in a triopoly (i.e., a fierce competition). On the other
hand, if Firm 1 proposes a two-firm coalition, it obtains a positive profit generated
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by access (because w > λ− 2µ and Firm 3 accesses its network), whereas the profit
generated by its own production decreases.8 Then, in our triopoly model, we can
find a critical level of w∗ above which a positive profit generated by access overcomes
a decrease in the profit generated by its own production. Therefore, Firm 1 prefers
a two-firm coalition to a grand coalition for w ∈ (w∗, λ− µ).9
3.3 Ineﬀectiveness of access charge
Let us turn to the first stage. What level of access charge should the regulator set
in this open-access environment with a deregulated retail market? The coalition
formation equilibrium derived in the previous section suggests that all the level of
access charge but w ∈ (w∗, λ− µ) achieves the same level of social welfare with
a grand coalition. In fact, when the grand coalition is formed, the level of access
charge cannot have any impact on the total production. In this sense, the regula-
tor may face an intrinsic dilemma between achieving the low production cost and
reducing a distortion generated by imperfect competition. This is because it can in-
directly control total production in the triopolistic market only through the change
in the level of access charge, and the reduction of the marginal cost is achieved by a
coalition formation among firms. Indeed, it can be shown that the grand coalition
equilibrium does not always achieve the social optimum. We will discuss this point
in the next section.
Before going to the next section, we should note that the social welfare (i.e.,
consumer welfare plus producer welfare) in the grand coalition equilibrium is still
8This is because, even though the equilibrium profit is higher than that in the case of a grand
coalition, its own production decreases.
9Note that, concerning Firm 3’s decision to access Firm 1’s network for w ∈ (w∗, λ− µ),
Sappington’s (2004) statement holds in the coalition formation equilibrium in our model: “because
of strategic downstream considerations, entrants always undertake eﬃcient make or buy decisions,
regardless of the prices at which they are authorized to buy inputs from incumbent suppliers”. In
particular, for all w ∈ (w∗, λ− µ), Firm 3, whose marginal cost is λ−µ, has access to the network
of Firm 1, whose marginal cost is λ− 2µ. That is, Firm 3 makes an eﬃcient decision from a social
point of view.
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larger than that in the equilibrium for a two-firm coalition with one firm access.
Indeed, the social welfare in the grand coalition equilibrium (Case 1) is:
SW 1 =
15
32
[α− (λ− 3µ)]2 , (3)
whereas the social welfare in the “two-firm coalition with one-firm access” equilib-
rium (Case 2) is:
SW 2 =
1
32
[3α− 2 (λ− 2µ)− w] [5α− 6 (λ− 2µ) + w] . (4)
We can easily show that ∆SW 12 ≡ SW 1 − SW 2 > 0 for ∀w ∈ [λ− 2µ,λ− µ].
Therefore, the regulator should avoid setting the access charge w such that its level
is between w∗ and λ− µ.
4 When to Delegate an Infrastructure Project to
Firms
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the regulator in our model faces an intrinsic dilemma
between achieving the low production cost and reducing a distortion generated by
imperfect competition.
In order to recognize the dilemma, let us consider as a benchmark the situation
in which the regulator can regulate not only the access charge but also the size of
coalition formation. In that situation, the regulator has to compare the levels of
social welfare in all the possible coalition formation structures with access (i.e., six
cases in Table 1) by adjusting the level of access charge. In fact, the social welfare
in the “one-firm coalition with two-firm access” equilibrium can be larger than that
in the grand coalition equilibrium by lowering the level of access charge, when the
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degree of the cost-reducing eﬀect generated by coalition formation is small.10 Let
us ensure this claim in the following.
The social welfare in the one-firm coalition with two-firm access equilibrium
(Case 4 in Table 1) is given by:
SW 4 =
1
32
{[α− 3 (λ− µ) + 2w] [7α− 5 (λ− µ)− 2w]
+8 [α+ (λ− µ)− 2w] [α− (λ− µ)]} , (5)
whereas the one in the grand coalition equilibrium is represented by SW 1 in (3).
[Insert Figures 2-1 and 2-2 around here.]
Figures 2-1 and 2-2 show a comparison of social welfare between SW 1 and SW 4.
In these figures, the dotted line represents SW 4, whereas the solid line represents
SW 1. In Figure 2-1, the vertical axis represents social welfare, while the horizontal
axis represents the level of access charge, w. The other parameters are set such
that α = 100, λ = 10, and µ = 0.2. As shown in Figure 2-1, when w is below
6.84, the social welfare in the one-firm coalition with two-firm access equilibrium
is larger than that in the grand coalition equilibrium. This is because the welfare-
enhancing eﬀect of an increase in total production generated by a low access charge
is larger than that resulting from a low production cost generated by formation
of a coalition. On the other hand, when w is above 6.84, the social welfare in the
grand coalition equilibrium is larger than that in the one-firm coalition with two-firm
access equilibrium. This result seems to be intuitively understood.
Interestingly, the social-welfare priority between the two equilibria depends not
only on the level of access charge but also on the degree of cost-reducing eﬀect
generated by coalition formation. In Figure 2-2, the vertical axis represents social
10It is easy to guess that the cases other than cases 1 and 4 cannot achieve the largest social
welfare among all the cases. Indeed, a tedious calculation confirms this claim.
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welfare, while the horizontal axis represents the parameter of the marginal cost,
µ, with α = 100, λ = 10, and w = 0.1. As µ increases, the cost-reducing eﬀect
generated by coalition formation increases. When µ is below 0.58, the social welfare
in the one-firm coalition with two-firm access equilibrium is larger than that in the
grand coalition equilibrium, and vice versa.
This point is easily confirmed by comparing the total production between the
two equilibria:11
∆Q41 ≡ Q4 −Q1
=
¡
q411 + 2q
42
2
¢
− 3q11i
=
1
2
[λ− 4µ− w] .
That is, the diﬀerence in total production between the two equilibria is a decreasing
function of the parameter of the marginal cost. Hence, we can expect that, when the
degree of cost-reducing eﬀect generated by coalition formation is small, consumer
welfare in the one-firm coalition with two-firm access equilibrium is suﬃciently large
for the social welfare in the equilibrium to overcome that in the grand coalition
equilibrium.
This result is also intuitively appealing. When the cost-reducing eﬀect generated
by coalition formation is small, the only eﬀective way to enhance social welfare is
a reduction of the level of access charge. However, the incumbent’s (Firm 1’s)
incentive for coalition formation does not depend on the absolute magnitude of the
cost-reducing eﬀect, but depends on the level of access charge.12 In fact, when
the level of access charge is low, the incumbent has an incentive to form a grand
11Needless to say, the comparison of social welfare between SW 1 and SW 4 is a direct way to
confirm the claim. Here, instead, we compare the total production between them in order to
explain the claim intuitively.
12Remember that a firm’s incentive for coalition formation also depends on the number of firms,
which is constant (i.e., three) here.
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coalition, as shown in Proposition 1. This means that the eﬀective way to enhance
total production (i.e., a change in the level of access charge) does not work in
the equilibrium. Therefore, when the cost-reducing eﬀect generated by coalition
formation is small, the social welfare can be increased if the regulator determines
not only the level of access charge but also the level of network investments (i.e.,
the size of coalition).
On the other hand, when the cost-reducing eﬀect generated by a coalition for-
mation is large (i.e., when µ is above 0.58 in Figure 2-2), SW 1 > SW 4. In this case,
the welfare-enhancing eﬀect of coalition formation is larger than that of an access
charge of w = 0.1. As shown in Figure 1, the incumbent, i.e., Firm 1, is willing to
form a grand coalition. This means that the private incentive to invest in a network
infrastructure is consistent with the social incentive to do so. Therefore, when the
cost-reducing eﬀect generated by coalition formation is large, the delegation of an
infrastructure project to firms can achieve the socially optimal allocation in our
model.
We summarize this argument as a proposition.
Proposition 2 In an open-access environment with a deregulated retail market,
the delegation of an infrastructure project to firms can achieve the socially optimal
allocation when the cost-reducing eﬀect generated by a coalition formation is large.
Proposition 2 clarifies the situation in which the delegation of investment in
an infrastructure to firms can be justified from a welfare point of view. As stated
in the introduction, we have observed (and will observe) some coalitions among
firms in the construction of an infrastructure such as gas pipelines in gas industries
or local fiber-optic cables in telecommunications. In an open-access environment
with a deregulated retail market, who should take the initiative to proceed with
infrastructure construction through a coalition of firms depends on the degree of
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cost-reducing eﬀect generated by the formation of a coalition. In particular, with
a large cost-reducing eﬀect generated by the coalition formation, a regulator can
delegate its initiative to firms, especially when the administrative cost of regulation
cannot be ignored.
Lastly, we should remember one important caveat about the delegation of an
infrastructure project through coalition formation. When delegating the project to
firms, the regulator should avoid setting the access charge w such that its level is
between w∗ and λ − µ in our model. This result suggests a policy implication for
forward-looking rules when firms form a coalition to build a network infrastructure.
If the regulator recognizes the marginal cost achieved by a single-firm coalition (i.e.,
λ−µ in our model) as a historical marginal cost and adopts the forward-looking rule,
there is a possibility that she sets w ∈ (w∗, λ− µ). From our analysis, it is shown
that this results in a welfare-deteriorating open-access environment, irrespective of
a large cost-reducing eﬀect generated by coalition formation. This means that the
regulator should beware of setting the access charge according to the forward-looking
rule.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided a simple model that examines a firm’s incentive to invest
in a network infrastructure through coalition formation in an open-access environ-
ment with a deregulated retail market. We have assumed that coalition formation
has a cost-reducing eﬀect on production cost. In that situation, a regulator faces
a dilemma between inducing an incentive for eﬃcient investment and reducing the
distortion generated by imperfect competition. We then have shown that the in-
formation concerning the degree of cost-reducing eﬀect of the investment is crucial
from a welfare point of view. In particular, when the infrastructure project through
15
coalition formation creates a large (small) cost-reducing eﬀect, the regulator can
(should not) delegate the project to firms by setting an appropriate level of access
charge. We have also discussed a policy implication of the forward-looking rules
when firms form a coalition to build a network infrastructure.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Following Lemma 1, we can divide the original problem into two cases according
to the level of access charge. First, consider the case in which w > λ − µ. In this
case, Firm 3 chooses a one-firm coalition whenever it has a chance to move. What
about the decision of Firm 2? When Firm 2 has a chance to move (i.e., when Firm 1
oﬀers a one-firm coalition), it has three alternatives: a two-firm coalition, a one-firm
coalition, and access to Firm 1’s (one-firm) network facility. Lemma 1 can then be
applied to Firm 2’s decision: when comparing the two alternatives of a one-firm
coalition and access to Firm 1’s network, it prefers a one-firm coalition. It is also
easy to ensure that given Firm 3’s decision to form a one-firm coalition, a two-firm
coalition is preferred to a one-firm coalition by comparing π312 with π
61
2 . Hence, Firm
2 chooses a two-firm coalition. Then, consider Firm 1’s decision. Expecting Firm 3’s
and Firm 2’s decisions, it obtains π111 (π
31
1 , π
61
1 , respectively) when choosing a three-
firm coalition (a two-firm coalition, a one-firm coalition, respectively). Comparing
the three profits, we ensure that Firm 1 chooses a grand coalition or a two-firm
coalition. Therefore, the market structure of a grand coalition, or that of a two-firm
coalition with a one-firm coalition, emerges in the case where w > λ− µ.13
Next, examine the case in which w ≤ λ− µ. In this case, Firm 3 prefers access
to a one-firm coalition, irrespective of the size of the incumbent coalitions. Consider
13This result is consistent with Bloch (1995).
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Firm 2’s decision. Since Firm 3 accesses Firm 1’s one-firm coalition even when Firm
2 forms a one-firm coalition, Firm 2 prefers access to Firm 1’s network to a one-firm
coalition by applying Lemma 1. Then, Firm 2’s profit when choosing access to Firm
1’s network is:
π422 =
1
16
[α+ (λ− µ)− 2w]2 ,
while the profit when choosing a two-firm coalition is:
π312 =
1
16
[α− λ+ 3µ]2 .
Comparing π422 with π
31
2 gives the following result.
π422
>
<
π312 ⇐⇒ w
<
>
λ− 2µ
That is, when λ− 2µ < w ≤ λ−µ, Firm 2 forms a two-firm coalition. On the other
hand, when λ −2µ ≥ w, Firm 2 accesses Firm 1’s network.
Lastly, consider Firm 1’s decision when w ≤ λ− µ. When choosing a three-firm
coalition, it obtains a profit of π111 . When choosing a two-firm coalition, its profit
is π211 , since Firm 3 chooses access. When choosing a one-firm coalition, its profit
depends on Firm 2’s decision, which, in turn, depends on the level of w. When
λ− 2µ < w ≤ λ− µ, Firm 1’s profit is π321 , since Firm 2 forms a two-firm coalition.
On the other hand, when λ −2µ ≥ w, Firm 1’s profit is π411 , since Firm 2 and Firm
3 access its network facility. Accordingly, we need to examine the equilibrium for
the two cases according to the level of access charge.
Consider the case where λ−2µ < w ≤ λ−µ. It is apparent that π111 is larger than
π321 . Next, let us compare π
11
1 and π
21
1 . Note that π
21
1 is an increasing function of w
as long as 2α− [5w − 3 (λ− 2µ)] > 0, which is naturally assumed. As w→ λ− 2µ,
π211 → 116 [α− λ+ 2µ]
2, which is less than π111 . On the other hand, as w → λ − µ,
17
π211 → 116 [α− λ+ 3µ]
2+ 1
8
µ [α− λ− µ], which is larger than π111 . Hence, there
exists a unique w∗ such that π111 is equal to π
21
1 .
Next, consider where λ −2µ ≥ w. In this case, we need to compare π111 , π211 ,
and π411 . Since π
21
1 is an increasing function of w and as w → λ − 2µ, π211 →
1
16
[α− λ+ 2µ]2 (< π111 ), π211 is not chosen by Firm 1. At w = λ − 2µ, π411 =
1
16
[α− λ− µ]2− 1
2
µ [α− λ+ 3µ], which is less than π111 , as long as α−(λ−2µ) > 0,
which is naturally assumed. Note that:
∂π411
∂w
=
1
4
[α− 3 (λ− µ) + 2w] + 1
2
[α+ 3 (λ− µ)− 4w] . (6)
The sign of (6) can be assumed to be positive. Hence, we can conclude that
Firm 1 chooses a three-firm coalition in the case where λ −2µ ≥ w. ¥
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Table 1  The Nash Production and the Associated Reduced Profits 
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Table 1 (continued)  The Nash Production and the Associated Reduced Profits 
 
Figure 1  The Equilibrium Profit of Firm 1 
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Figure 2-2  The Effect of Cost-Reduction on Social Welfare 
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